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Business-Managed Democracy: The Trade Agenda
Sharon Beder
Abstract:
The architecture of global governance that has emerged in the past two decades has
been strongly influenced by transnational policy actors. This article examines the role
of transnational corporate agency in social policy by focusing in particular on the role
of business coalitions, elite networking bodies and policy planning groups in fostering
unity amongst corporate actors and enrolling political actors into managing
democracies in the interests of business. The example of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) is used to
examine how corporate agency is wielded through elite networking organisations and
how this is eroding national social policy.
keywords: business influence, corporate coalitions, GATT negotiations, World Trade
Organization, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the many powerful business coalitions that corporations have formed
in recent decades is to ensure that corporate interests are advanced over the welfare,
health and other interests of national populations and to undermine the democratic
process for deciding government priorities and policies. What business leaders seek,
and to a large extent have achieved, are ‘business-managed democracies’, that is,
democracies where the politics and cultural life of nations are managed in the
interests of business.
Klaus Schwab, a long-time president of the World Economic Forum (a group formed
from 1000 CEOs of the world’s largest corporations), argued in 1999 that the
“sovereign state has become obsolete” and that the preference of the chief executives of
large corporations is for national governments to become subservient to corporate and
financial interests (Quoted in Machan, 1999; Overbeck, 1998). David Rockefeller
(1999, p. 41) wrote in Newsweek that business people favour lessening the role of
government but that this means that “somebody has to take government’s place, and
business seems to me to be a logical entity to do it.” Rockefeller was founder and
chairman of the Trilateral Commission, an elite group of business leaders and others
from the US, Japan and Europe seeking to guide international affairs.
Corporations have always had a certain amount of power through their ability to
make decisions concerning production and employment. And as they have grown in
size and number that economic power has become significant and has been used to
exert political influence. Individual corporations frequently influence the political
process on matters of immediate financial interest to themselves through donations
and lobbying and the threat of transferring their activities abroad. They also play a
major role in setting the political and the public agenda through their use of public
relations, lobbying, and funding of third parties such as media, think tanks, and
business organizations. (Beder, 2002 & 2006b)
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However, corporations have not been content with the degree of economic power and
political influence they can wield individually. Since the mid-20th Century they have
sought to increase their collective power, consolidating their political influence to
pressure governments to make decisions in favour of business interests. And since the
1970s corporate coalitions have moved from defending their economic freedom from
the demands and interventions of labour unions and governments, to being far more
aggressive in their goals extending them from just determining economic policy to
social policy as well. Their takeover of key areas of government policy making and
service provision has meant that as time goes by democratic power is undermined and
thwarted (Beder, 2006a).
Many of the subsequent changes since the 1980s have been blamed on the rise of
neoliberalism. However it is important to recognise that for many years neoliberal
economic theories were considered marginal and obsolete. They moved from the
margins of economic thought to the centre of orthodoxy because they became useful to
business interests seeking to minimize government interference in their activities and
expand markets. Neoliberal theories were embraced by big business because they
provided a legitimation for their unimpeded pursuit of self-interest and avenues for
business expansion. The policy prescriptions that suited business best—including
privatisation of government services and deregulation of labour and business—were
justified by this body of economic theory that presented such policies as being in the
public interest (Beder, 2006b: ch. 7).
However, neoliberalism is only useful for business-managing society when the
economy is expanding and corporate profits are increasing. In times of economic
downturn, as the recent global financial crisis has demonstrated, business leaders
manage governments into supplying bailouts for companies and government spending
for economic stimulus. The apparent retreat from neoliberal policies doesn’t signal a
retreat of business from managing democracies. Business-friendly policies are being
maintained in business-managed democracies around the world.
This paper will focus on the way business coalitions have sought to expand markets
through the exercise of business-managed democracy. It will show how they have
mobilised and lobbied to get governments to sign up to trade agreements. These
agreements are portrayed as being about economic trade but are really about ensuring
that the social and environmental policy and regulations of nation states does not
interfere with the ability of transnational corporations (TNCs) to invest, trade and sell
their services anywhere in the world. In particular, the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) is aimed at promoting and locking in the commodification,
privatisation and deregulation of public services ranging from water, waste disposal,
electricity and telecommunications through to welfare, health and education, so that
TNCs can profit from them.

POLITICAL MOBILISATION
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The political mobilization of business interests since the 1970s meant that
corporations began to act as a class with a shared ideology rather than a collection of
competing companies with some common business interests. The class consciousness
of top corporate executives was facilitated by the growth of inter-corporate networks of
ownership and interlocking directorates of large corporations, which gave rise to a
growing number of corporate executives who occupied positions on the boards of
several companies. These corporate executives became politically active on behalf of
business in general. They provided the leadership for business coalitions and
associations and were employed at the top levels of the largest corporations (Useem,
1984:5). Many of these coalitions are now global in their reach reflecting the
transnational nature of the modern corporation. The corporate class has evolved into a
transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 2000).
The inner circle of corporate executives facilitated the formation of many business
associations and coalitions that sought a more general political agenda than
traditional trade associations; one that was not industry or region specific. The new
associations present a united front for their corporate members and assert the power
of large corporations in political forums. These associations cooperate with each other
and “perform largely complementary tasks.” (Useem, 1984: 70-1) They not only share
members and even leaders, but associations and coalitions often join other
associations and coalitions as members, or create new associations and coalitions for
specific purposes.
In this way a vast network of business coalitions and groups, supported by an array of
corporate-funded think tanks and public relations firms, proliferated during the 1980s
and 90s. Their purpose is not only to coordinate public relations campaigns as in
earlier times but to exert collective pressure on policy makers. For example the rise of
Thatcherism in Britain can be attributed in large part to the endeavours of two think
tanks: the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS).
In the US too, conservative corporate-funded think tanks have been responsible for
the transmission and promotion of free market ideas and policies since the rise of
Reagan in the 1980s (Beder, 2006a: chapter 1). In both cases, social policy was
dominated by the privatisation of services such as health, education, water and
electricity, as well as restrictions on government spending affecting welfare provision.

THE WTO: UNDERMINING CITIZEN DEMOCRACY
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the organization that ensures that trade
rules prioritise business interests over national and public interests. It has greater
powers than any other international institution including powers to punish noncomplying nations that are not even available to the United Nations. Over 130 nations
are now members of the WTO. It has become a form of global government in its own
right with judicial, legislative and executive powers. (Clarke, c. 1999: 4-5)
the WTO has come to rival the International Monetary Fund as the most
powerful, secretive, and anti-democratic international body on earth. It is
rapidly assuming the mantle of a bona fide global government for the ‘free
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trade era,’ and it actively seeks to broaden its powers and reach (Barker &
Mander, 1999: 1).
The WTO is able to enforce its rules through its dispute settlement mechanism. If one
country complains that another is not abiding by WTO rules, the case is heard by
panels of unelected lawyers and trade officials “with no education or training in social
or environmental issues”, behind closed doors with no public scrutiny. These panels
are able to find countries guilty of breaking the rules and to impose economic
sanctions as punishment. (Barker & Mander, 1999: 2)
Such rulings can declare as illegal legislation put in place by democratically elected
governments as part of their social or environmental policy agenda. The WTO has
fairly extensive powers to discipline nation states—as well as local, state and regional
governments—for regulations and controls that are claimed to interfere with trade.
WTO rules also take precedence over other international agreements designed to
protect public health and welfare including agreements such as the Convention on
Biodiversity and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(Barker & Mander, 1999: 6).
WTO rulings consistently favour free trade over environmental or social
considerations. CorpWatch noted that between 1995 and 2001 “the WTO has ruled
that every environmental policy it has reviewed is an illegal trade barrier that must
be eliminated or changed.” The same was true of health and safety laws with only one
exception (Anon, 2001). A more recent study by Public Citizen (2008: 3) found that
almost 90 percent of the 137 WTO challenges to national laws between 1995 and 2008
were successful, forcing nations to alter their laws to fit with WTO rules.
A good example of how trade priorities trump social policy priorities occurred in 2004
when a WTO panel ruled that the US government could not ban internet gambling.
The panel conceded ‘that the measures at issue were indeed designed so as to protect
public morals or to maintain public order’ but decided that the measures were not
allowable because:
the United States had failed to demonstrate that they were ‘necessary’ since
it had not shown that there was no WTO-consistent alternative measure
reasonably available that would provide the United States with the same
level of protection against the risks it had identified. (WTO Panel, 2004:
135)
In answer to the issue of whether a nation had the right to regulate in response to
democratically formulated policy, the panel of three trade experts that made the
gambling ruling stated: ‘Members’ regulatory sovereignty is an essential pillar of the
progressive liberalization of trade in services, but this sovereignty ends whenever
rights of other Members under the GATS are impaired.’ (WTO Panel, 2004: 209)
In other words, the ban on internet gambling was ruled to be a trade restriction that
interfered with the rights of another member of GATS – in this specific case the
complainant state, Antigua – where at least one transnational gambling corporation
had its nominal base of operations. According to the ruling, if the US wants to protect
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public morals it has to find a way to do it which does not restrict corporate rights to
trade. Otherwise the onus is on the US government to prove no such alternative
exists.
The WTO ruling required US social policy with respect to gambling to be changed at
both the state and federal levels of government.
In 2008 Public Citizen published a report showing that many of the proposed health
and environmental policies being proposed by US presidential candidates would
require modification to WTO rules before they could be passed. For example, Obama’s
proposal to require large employers to contribute to the health insurance of their
employees could be interpreted as favouring small employers that would mainly be
locally owned and this would be discriminatory against larger foreign companies. The
report concluded that “unless a government could foresee that it would need to take
future action on an unimaginably broad swath of policy areas when it made its initial
WTO commitments in 1994, it now faces unacceptable WTO constraints on new nontrade policies deemed necessary”, including social policies (Public Citizen, 2008).

BUSINESS LOBBYING
A range of powerful corporate lobbying groups and coalitions were crucial in
advancing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and establishing the
WTO. Within each of the major nations that dominated the GATT negotiations,
business leaders had privileged access to influence their country’s negotiating position.
The economic or trade ministry officials involved in the negotiations were lobbied
extensively by industry at both a national level and an international level by groups
such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the OECD's Business and
Industry Advisory Council (BIAC) (Hoedeman & al., 1998). No other non-government
groups had the access or influence accorded to business groups. In this way, the
negotiating positions of the dominant nations reflected business interests rather than
a broad spectrum of democratic interests.
Several large and powerful business organizations campaigned for the successful
completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in 1994 and the expansion of
free trade. They included the International Chamber of Commerce, The Bilderberg
Club and the Trilateral Commission (Beder, 2006a).
The European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) was a leading lobbying force
during the Uruguay Round and it claims some of the credit for the completion of the
Round. Its Trade & Investment working group worked closely with the US Business
Roundtable. (ERT, 2003a; 2003b: 40) The ERT was founded in 1983 to represent
European business interests and their push for free trade. It was modeled on the
Business Roundtable in the US. Membership is by invitation only and includes Chairs
and CEOs of major multinational companies headquartered in Europe, including
Bayer, Fiat, BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, Unilever, Volvo, Hoffmann-La Roche, Total,
Renault and Siemens (ERT, 2004).
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The ERT has had privileged access to EU policy-makers and national government
leaders and that access has become institutionalized as the ERT has been integrated
into EU committees. Its privileged access to ministers and leaders is reinforced by
personal contacts and friendships, including those between successive ERT chairs and
EC Presidents. (CEO, 1997; Doherty & Hoedeman, 1994; ERT, 2003b: 33,46). At the
end of the Uruguay Round an ERT delegation of 14 CEOs met with the French prime
minister “to help resolve the European position in the talks” (ERT, 2003b: 53).
The US-based MTN (Multilateral Trade Negotiations) Coalition was formed in 1990 as
part of the lobbying effort to kick start the suspended negotiations. The Coalition
lobbied within the US for congressional support for the GATT negotiations and also
outside the US. Coalition representatives visited London in 1991 to “drum up British
support for a wide-ranging trade agreement”. (Norman, 1991: 13)
The MTN Coalition claimed to represent 14,000 US companies including the major
multinationals such as IBM, General Motors, American Express, General Electric,
Citicorp and associations such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
and the US Council for International Business (USCIB). It claimed to be “the largest
coalition in history.” (quoted in Peng, 1990: 10)
The World Economic Forum (WEF) also played a major role during the Uruguay
Round. The WEF claims to be the “leading interface for business/ government
interaction” and “a major force for economic integration at the corporate as well as the
national economic levels.” (WEF, 2000) The WEF has power through the financial
power of its members. It wields influence through bringing the world’s top business
people and top policy makers together at its annual meetings at Davos and elsewhere.
Its meetings include an Informal Gathering of Trade Ministers (Beder, 2006a: 112).

TRADE IN SERVICES
The Uruguay Round went far beyond, in both power and scope, the limited objectives
of lowering tariffs on manufactured goods. Pressured by TNCs, negotiators from the
US and the EU sought to include services, intellectual property rights and investment
rights as part of GATT despite the opposition of developing nations (Beder, 2006a).
Included in the final GATT agreement was the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS). The aim of GATS is to open up the provision of all services—
including health, education, water, electricity and telecommunications—to foreign
investment through privatisation and deregulation (referred to as liberalisation). It
prohibits governments from discriminating against foreign multinational companies
that want to buy government services or compete to supply them, in areas that
governments agree to liberalise.
Under GATS rules, once a country decides to liberalise its electricity or water it cannot
put any limits on foreign ownership nor limit how much of the industry one company
can own. Also a government is not allowed to favour local businesses, so that if it
subsidizes renewable sources of electricity, such as hydroelectricity, and these
subsidized sources are mainly owned by local companies, then that could be
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interpreted as discriminating against foreign service providers that use ‘dirty’ sources
of power like oil and gas (Cohen, 2002: 10-11).
Also, if services such as health and education are committed to GATS then
government subsidies would be seen as giving unfair advantage to local providers. And
it is likely that governments would not be able to set price caps on the fees charged for
essential services like water and electricity. Governments would therefore lose the
ability to ensure that these services were affordable to their poorer citizens (unless
sectors of the population are directly subsidized with taxpayer funds, which would be
paid to the foreign companies) (CEO, 2000c).
GATS also prevents national governments from putting quantitative limits on services
once a service sector has been committed. So if a government agrees to liberalise
tourism services, for instance, it cannot then limit the number of beach resorts to
protect the environment or the community atmosphere of an area without being
subject to challenge under GATS rules (Wesselius, 2002: 5).
GATS restrains governments from imposing social policy standards that might hinder
free trade in these services. Article VI of the GATS agreement only allows regulations
where regulatory objectives are legitimate; the regulation is necessary; and the
regulation does not restrict trade more than necessary (ESF, 2002: 5). Illegitimate
regulations might include professional standards, taxation policies, and other policies
to achieve objectives such as preserving government services or providing
employment. (Wesselius, 2002: 4)
As a practical matter, this means nations will have to shape laws protecting the
air you breathe, the trains you travel in and the food you chew by picking not the
best or safest means for the nation, but the cheapest methods for foreign
investors and merchants (Palast, 2001a).
Attempts within the WTO to establish a list of legitimate objectives for regulations
has proven difficult. GATS requires that domestic regulations such as environmental
regulations should be developed in accordance with international standards, that is, if
regulations accord with international standards they would meet the necessity test
(ESF, 2002: 5-6).
As part of the official offers and requests process aimed at expanding GATS
commitments, the European Commission (EC) has requested that other nations open
up their water sectors, large parts of their energy sectors including electricity, and
other sectors such as transport, to competition from abroad. These requests were not
an outcome of democratic decision making in Europe but were kept secret until they
were leaked.
There are ongoing efforts to keep GATS offers and requests secret and therefore to
inhibit public debate and democratic input into decision-making. In January 2003,
Pascal Lamy, the EC trade commissioner advised governments that they would not be
able to distribute copies of offers to their parliaments (Anon, 2003: 7).
The Corporate Europe Observatory argues that these requests show that the EC
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intends ‘to use the GATS talks to deregulate and de facto privatise essential services,
particularly in the South’ (CEO, 2002). According to the World Development
Movement, any developing country escaping privatization of services under World
Bank or IMF structural adjustment packages, or seeking to reverse them, ‘will feel a
left hook coming in from the WTO’. It notes that if GATS negotiations are successful,
‘governments will be forced to privatise services and the sale will be irreversible’
(WDM, 2001: 3). Moreover, GATS will provide an excuse for governments that want to
privatize against the will of the people, for reasons of corruption or ideology or
misconception. They can pass on responsibility for the decision to the WTO which has
required it.

TRADE IN SERVICES COALITIONS
The role of multinational corporations in incorporating services into the free trade
agenda is undisputed. David Hartridge, Director of the WTO Services Division till
2001, admitted that ‘without the enormous pressure generated by the American
financial services sector, particularly companies like American Express and Citicorp,
there would have been no services agreement.’ (Quoted in Puscas, 2003: 3)
The Coalition of Service Industries (CSI), a group of large US-based multinational forprofit service corporations, was formed in 1982 with American Express playing a
major coordinating role. Its initial purpose was to get services included in the GATT
round of negotiations and to make trade in services ‘a central goal of future trade
liberalization initiatives’ (CSI, 2003a).
CSI boasts of its ‘excellent access to U.S. and foreign governments and international
organizations’ (Vastine, 2002: 1). According to its chair in 2000, Harry Freeman (2000:
458) (formerly a vice president of American Express): ‘The U.S. private sector on
trade in services is probably the most powerful trade lobby, not only in the United
States but also in the world.’ CSI’s ‘foremost goal is to open foreign markets to US
business and allow them to compete abroad.’ (CSI, 2003b).
CSI claims to have ‘played an aggressive role in writing’ and ‘ shaping’ the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), included in the WTO at the end of the
Uruguay Round (Vastine, 1999). Freeman (2000: 458) states: ‘At the close of the
Uruguay Round, we lobbied and lobbied. We had about 400 people from the U.S.
private sector.’
CSI has ongoing goals with respect to trade in services. It wants nations to commit to
pensions policies that would ‘encourage private savings for retirement’ and thus
provide opportunities for foreign investment companies to profit from people’s
retirement, which would be precluded by a government pension scheme (CSI, 1999).
The Bush administration subsequently pushed for this approach to aged pensions in
the US (Beder, 2006b).
Health care services are another CSI target. The CSI makes the doubtful claim that
competition in the US health care field has enabled cost reductions to occur whilst
quality has improved. The companies involved stand to gain from the opportunities
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that the rapid growth of health care expenditures in some other countries might offer.
This requires that nations open up their health care markets to competition and allow
majority foreign ownership of their health care facilities. (CSI, 1999)
US companies have been excluded from this profit opportunity by the fact that health
care has traditionally been a government responsibility in most countries. In OECD
countries barriers such as restrictive licensing of health care professionals and
‘excessive privacy and confidentiality regulations’ continue to be an obstacle to foreign
companies (CSI, 1999).
The CSI demonstrated the power of business coalitions in setting the agenda and
influencing the outcomes of trade negotiations during the Uruguay Round and
subsequent negotiations. In fact it inspired similar service industry coalitions in other
countries that hope to profit from access to markets in foreign countries (O’Hare, 2002:
2). These include the Australian Services Roundtable, the Irish Coalition of Service
Industries and the Hong Kong Coalition of Service Industries.
But CSI did more than provide a model to emulate. It also actively took part in the
formation of later coalitions. Freeman and the CSI played a major role in the
formation and running of some of these business coalitions, including the MTN
(Multilateral Trade Negotiations) Coalition, the Financial Leaders Group and the
Global Services Network. CSI is also one of the Associate Expert Groups for the
Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD.
On the other side of the Atlantic, British Invisibles (BI – renamed later as
International Financial Services, London, IFSL), a UK business coalition, played an
active role in forming and running national and European business coalitions to push
for GATS (Beder, 2006a). Unlike CSI, British Invisibles formalized its access to key
government bureaucrats through a committee structure that included sympathetic
government officials from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), HM Treasury,
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Bank of England and the Financial
Services Authority (FSA). This Liberalisation of Trade in Services (LOTIS) committee
began meeting in the early 1980s with the aim of influencing the GATT negotiations.
It became the main lobbying organization for the UK financial services industry.
(IFSL 2003)
Because of the hybrid business/government nature of the LOTIS committee, financial
corporations were privy to government information that was not publicly available,
including internal EU papers and draft submissions to the WTO from other nations.
They also had high level access to government negotiators and WTO officials (Beder,
2006a).
Leaked documents indicate that the LOTIS committee was influential in getting EC
negotiators to push for a strict ‘necessity test’ within GATS. A WTO secretariat memo
states that trade ministers had agreed that if such regulations were challenged in the
WTO, a defense of “safeguarding the public interest” would be rejected. The memo
suggests that if the WTO adopted ‘efficiency’ as a criterion rather than public interest,
then government leaders would have more excuse to eliminate unwanted social and
environmental regulations even if their citizens wanted them. If regulatory authorities
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or citizen groups demand regulation, politicians could avoid it by saying that WTO
rules would not allow it as it was too burdensome to industry. (Palast, 2001b)

GETTING A NEW ROUND STARTED
Following the successful outcome of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the
WTO in 1995, various business lobbies worked to get a new round of WTO
negotiations started that would include issues such as investment and the opening of
government procurement to tender from foreign companies. The chair of the US
Council for International Business (USCIB), Dean O’Hare (2001), claimed to have
“helped secure the launch of the new round of WTO trade negotiations” using the
networks of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the OECD's Business
and Industry Advisory Council “to build overseas support for U.S. business objectives”
in the new round:
American business stands to be a major winner from the new round of trade
liberalization talks… USCIB worked diligently to help set the table for a
new round, laying out benchmarks for U.S. negotiators in a variety of areas
and exploring the possible inclusion of new issues like competition policy,
environment and investment.
The Europeans have also played an active role in promoting the new round. The ERT
established a working group on Foreign Economic Relations in 1998, chaired by Peter
Sutherland, formerly Director-General of GATT. It led delegations to meet with the
Director-General of the WTO, Renato Ruggiero, and Mike Moore when he took over
from Ruggiero. The ERT continues to work with the US Business Roundtable (BRT) to
assure the success of this new round of negotiations. (ERT, 2003b: 68, 97)
Similarly the European employers association, UNICE, had seven working groups and
more than 20 lobbyists on WTO issues. Renamed BusinessEurope in 2007 it claims to
represent “more than 20 million small, medium, and large companies” through
membership of “40 central industrial and employers’ federations from 34 countries”
(BusinessEurope, 2009). It worked with the EC to gather support for a new,
comprehensive round that would include issues such as investment and government
procurement. It was “by far the most visible European lobby group” at the 1999
Seattle WTO Ministerial meeting. (CEO, 2000a, 2000b)
Business groups had hoped a new round would begin at WTO Ministerial meeting in
Seattle in December 1999 and spent millions lobbying to that end (Madeley, 2000: 11,
16). The US Alliance for Trade Expansion (USTrade) ran a series of ‘education’ events
across the US in the lead up to the Seattle meeting. It also organized a ‘war room’ in
Seattle in the week before the WTO ministerial meeting “to provide rapid response
from the pro-trade business community to the many allegations expected to be raised
by protestors” (Paulson, 1999; USTrade, 1999).
USTrade was chaired by executives from Boeing, Caterpillar and Procter and Gamble.
Its steering committee included members of the American Chemistry Council, the
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), Ford Motor Company, Texas
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Instruments, the Business Roundtable, USCIB and the US Chamber of Commerce. It
was housed at NAM. As with other coalitions its members featured a who’s who of
American corporations and trade associations including the American Petroleum
Institute, Bayer, Chubb, DaimlerChrysler, DuPont, Federal Express, HewlettPackard, the National Mining Association, Nestle, Pfizer (USTrade, 1999, 2002).
The Seattle host committee, chaired by Bill Gates, CEO of Microsoft and Philip
Condit, CEO of Boeing, offered corporations various levels of access to negotiators and
ministers according to their level of donation (Clarke, c. 1999: 1). However at the
meeting the US and the EU could not agree on agricultural trade concessions and
developing countries claimed that whilst they were having to open up their markets
the affluent countries were not making similar concessions. Developing countries, sick
and tired of being marginalised in the decision-making process, and encouraged by
the vigorous street protests going on outside, refused to passively go along with any
negotiated deal that they had not participated in. (Kwa, 2003: 19; Madeley, 2000: 1314)
To counter the growing public opposition to free trade negotiations, particularly with
regard to services and investment, business launched a new public relations
campaign. Opposition to the expansion of free trade rules was labelled ‘globophobia’,
and business groups sought to portray free trade in a more favourable light (Beder,
2006a: 194-200).
Hoedeman and Doherty (2002: 67, 71) describe how: “Since Seattle, US business has
engaged in a multi-faceted, multimillion-dollar counter-campaign involving individual
corporations, lobby groups like the Business Roundtable and the US Chamber of
Commerce, corporate-sponsored think tanks, and of course the ever-faithful PR
industry”. Similarly Phillip Babich (2000) from the National Radio Project noted how
“corporations are showering the US congress with well-funded lobbying campaigns
and pro-free trade think-tanks are engaging in an information war for public opinion.”
European business coalitions such as the ERT and the European Service Forum (ESF)
“intensified their behind-the-scenes lobbying and left the public” campaigning to
Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and industry-funded think tanks such as the
European Policy Centre and the Centre for European Policy Studies. Exceptions
included an information campaign by Swedish Employer Organisation, Svenskt
Nringsliv, targeting high school students and a campaign by the Association of
German Industries (BDI). (Hoedeman & Doherty, 2002: 67, 71, 72)

THE DOHA ROUND
At the next ministerial meeting in Doha in 2001 developing countries again found
themselves marginalised. However this time the US and the EU were more united.
This was partly because of the efforts of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD)
(CEO, 2001; Kwa, 2003: 19; Public Citizen, 2003).
TABD is a coalition of 100 CEOs of US and European companies formed in 1995 to
present a unified and powerful front to trade negotiators. Because its membership
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consists of corporate CEOs of large TNCs, TABD has high level daily access to
governments and uses it to pressure them to sign up for business-friendly trade
agreements such as GATS. The Clinton Administration “established an entire interagency working group just to work on the TABD’s demands.” (Public Citizen, 2003;
TABD, 2002, 2004)
Balanyá et. al., (2000: 107) note that: “Over the past few years, the TABD has
presented its demands in the form of a ‘scorecard’, setting ‘priorities’ for governments
to focus on, and even going as far as to set ‘deadlines’ for completion. The audacity of
this ‘scorecard’ approach reflects the cosy relationship the TABD enjoys with
government, and its conviction that its recommendations will be carried out.”
TABD develops policies that suit big business. The US and the EU then present them
to the WTO as ‘done deals’. Public Citizen (Public Citizen, 2003) notes: “The TABD has
been labelled the ‘new paradigm for trade liberalization’ by its proponents because it
eliminates the ‘middle man’ from trade policy-making. That middle man is the U.S.
and E.U. governments, and by extension, U.S. and E.U. citizens and consumer, labor
and environmental NGOs.”
The TABD gives the US-EU block strategic direction in the WTO negotiations and this
provides a formidable power block to bully and marginalise smaller countries. This
was evident at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha in 2001. An African delegate
claimed: “we made so many suggestions before Doha but they were ignored… We gave
texts. We didn’t know where they went, but they didn’t find their way to the draft
declaration”. Similarly a South Asian delegate pointed out: “We would object to a text,
but it would still appear. We would state we wanted a text added in, and still it would
not appear.” (quoted in Kwa, 2003: 23)
The BRT joined with ERT, the ICC and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives in
2003 to launch a multimillion dollar advertising campaign to support the Doha Round.
The aim was to persuade the public that further free trade will create billions of
dollars worth of wealth for all concerned. (BRT, 2003; Anon, 2005; InvestmentWatch,
2003)
The draft text presented to the 2003 Cancún meeting was put together by the WTO
without consultation with the full WTO membership and reflected the position of the
US and the EU rather than the developing nations (Hilary, 2004: 6, 10). A major
reason for the intransigence of the US and the EU in the negotiations was the
pressure being put on them by business. Not only were various powerful business
coalitions pushing for free trade to be expanded to incorporate free investment but the
agribusiness lobby was well represented at Cancún. The US delegation alone included
some 70 corporate advisers, including those representing the interests of agricultural
corporations. These interests were also well represented on the EC delegation. (Hilary,
2004: 22)
Whilst corporate advisors were included on many delegations and had access to
negotiating documents, NGOs and civil society representatives were excluded. Those
developing nations that tried to include them were pressured not to, according to an
ActionAid report that cited Uganda and Kenya as examples. Similarly the UK
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criticised some EU countries for sharing too much information with civil society
representatives. (Hilary, 2004: 23)
Further negotiations in 2004 resulted in the dropping of investment, government
procurement and competition policy from the agenda of the current round of
negotiations but in return “developing nations will have to open up their economies to
imports of manufactured goods and to large service companies in return for vague
promises on agricultural reform.” (WDM, 2004)
USTrade was reborn in 2005 as ABCDoha (American Business Coalition for Doha)
with a mission of amplifying “the voice of American business in advocating for an
ambitious, balanced, and comprehensive agreement from the Doha Round”, by
working closely with “the U.S. Administration, U.S. Congress, WTO leadership,
officials and colleagues in other WTO member countries, and other NGOs” as well as
“conducting widespread education campaigns about the benefits of trade
liberalization” (ABCDoha, 2006).
The business community continues to press for a successful conclusion of the Doha
Round. In April 2009 the G8 Business Leaders, a group representing business
coalitions in G8 nations, declared the need for G8 governments to “strengthen and
publicly renew their full commitment to an open global economy… The successful
conclusion of the Doha Round lies at the very heart” of this commitment and would
provide “the strongest possible stimulus for the recovery of the global economy” (G8
Business Leaders, 2009).
G8 government leaders have not been slow to confirm their commitment to open global
trade.i The difficulty for Doha negotiators is persuading the rest of the world that it is
in their interests to sign up to this business-managed democracy.

CONCLUSION
Business coalitions and networks work on the principle that a “combined voice is more
powerful than one that is fragmented” (Buxton, 1999: 2). Companies that are
theoretically competitors in the market, cooperate with each other to protect business
interests against democratic regulations and restrictions. Individual firms network
with national sectoral associations, national sectoral associations network within
national peak associations such as the US Chamber of Commerce or USCIB, and
national peak associations network with international peak associations such as the
ICC (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000: 491).
USCIB (2003) notes that:
Leading American companies increasingly recognize that, to succeed
abroad, they must join together with like-minded firms to influence laws,
rules and policies that may undermine U.S. competitiveness, wherever they
may be… By helping shape international regulation and expand market
access for U.S. products and services, USCIB members can lower the costs
of doing business abroad and enhance their long-term profitability.
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The European Services Forum (ESF) similarly recognized that: “By tabling a
coordinated document, the industry will be stronger within the European Union and
vis-à-vis the other WTO Member States and will give to their sectoral requests a
political dimension that individual sectors will not be able to achieve.” (Kerneis, 2000:
5)
A great number of trade coalitions have been formed for this purpose of presenting a
combined and powerful voice for business. These coalitions are tightly networked and
closely interrelated through their common corporate membership. This multiplicity of
coalitions with heavily overlapping membership and leadership enables corporations
to multiply their power and influence.
The enlistment of regulators, bureaucrats and politicians in their cause has been a key
achievement of those lobbying for various agreements within the GATT and the WTO.
This is made easier by the phenomenon of the revolving door. Large corporations are
able to offer lucrative positions, including directorships, to those who are supportive of
their aims.
The “unprecedented levels of strategic alliances and global networks” created by TNCs
have been referred to as a new form of capitalism: ‘alliance capitalism’. In this new
form of capitalism, TNCs have more in common with, and show more loyalty to, TNCs
from around the world than with the countries where they are headquartered (Sklair,
2002: 65). Despite this shift in allegiance, national governments still go out of their
way to facilitate the business activities of these TNCs and to ensure government social
policies do not unduly impede those activities.
Trade issues have traditionally been considered to be an area that should be handled
by specialist experts in trade, who make technocratic decisions, rather than elected
officials accountable to the public. WTO papers are not published and trade
negotiators do not discuss the likely trade offs they will have to make—such as the
loss of government autonomy over social services—with citizens of their countries
before they embark on the negotiations, nor are the citizens informed of the content of
the negotiations and the positions taken by their negotiators. (Braithwaite & Drahos,
2000: 209-11; Esty, 2002: 10)
The rise of corporate power and the increasing importance accorded to markets mean
that TNCs are eclipsing the nation state as the driving force behind policy-making.
The corporate goal of free trade has been given precedence over other citizen goals
such as environmental protection, improved working conditions, affordable and
accessible electricity and water, universal health care and schooling. Each of these
areas of social policy has been subject to commodifiation, marketisation, privatisation
and deregulation in the name of free markets.
So-called ‘free’ markets are becoming the new organising principle for the global order.
The idea that governments should protect citizens against the excesses of free
enterprise has been replaced with the idea that government should protect business
activities against the excesses of democratic regulation. The bottom line is a businessmanaged democracy.
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